Augustine's development on testimonial knowledge
Abstract: Augustine is probably the first in western philosophy to explicitly defend an account of testimonial knowledge. I argue that he gives testimony, as an epistemic source, different statuses over three stages. First, he says that testimony can yield nothing more than belief (credere); next, h...
Author: | Matthew Kent Siebert |
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Published: |
S.n.,
s.l.,
2018
|
Volume: | 56 |
Pages: | 215-237 |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Abstract, 215. |
Periodical: | Journal of the History of Philosophy |
Number: | 2 |
Format: | Article |
Topic: | -
Biography
>
Relations and Sources
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Platonism - Neo-platonism
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General studies
- Biography > Relations and Sources > Stoicism - Doctrine > Man > [Doctrine de la connaissance] > [Raison-Autorité. Raison-Foi] > Faith |
Status: | Needs Review |
Summary: | Abstract: Augustine is probably the first in western philosophy to explicitly defend an account of testimonial knowledge. I argue that he gives testimony, as an epistemic source, different statuses over three stages. First, he says that testimony can yield nothing more than belief (credere); next, he says that it can yield scientia; but in the end, he says that it yields lower level knowledge (notitia), but not scientia, strictly speaking. Along the way, I explain various motivations for Augustine’s innovations, and point out his Platonic, Stoic, and ordinary language sources. I also argue that he takes testimonial knowledge to be justified by inference rather than by default entitlement, and I show that in his last two stages there is an underlying unity that is obscured by shifts in the way he uses the term scientia. |
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