De ordo sapientiae : Augustine's program for philosophical study in his early works

Abstract : In De beata vita and De ordine Augustine makes a distinction between rational knowledge of truth and rational knowledge of that upon which truth depends, and in both dialogues knowledge of that upon which truth depends is categorized as the higher form of the two. Knowledge of truth is at...

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Bibliographic Details
Author:John Paletta
Published: S.n., s.l., 2011
Volume:61
Pages:55-74
Language:English
Periodical:Augustiniana
Number:1-2
Format:Article
Topic:- Works > Dialogues / Early works > De beata vita
- Works > Dialogues / Early works > De ordine
- Doctrine > Man > [Doctrine de la connaissance]
- Doctrine > Being > Truth > [Connaissance de la vérité]
Status:Active
Description
Summary:Abstract : In De beata vita and De ordine Augustine makes a distinction between rational knowledge of truth and rational knowledge of that upon which truth depends, and in both dialogues knowledge of that upon which truth depends is categorized as the higher form of the two. Knowledge of truth is attained through a version of the argument from judgement, that is, by reflecting on the immutable nature of reason. In regard to this argument Augustine notes that the knowledge it achieves is ambiguous because it does not establish whether the mind is truth, or is in truth. The manner in which one arrives at knowledge of that upon which truth depends is left unexplained. Analysis of De immortalitate animae, however, establishes the theoretical foundation for the distinction between truth and that upon which truth depends made in De beata vita and De ordine. More specifically, Augustine overcomes the ambiguous form of knowledge arrived at via the argument of judgement and arrives at definite knowledge concerning the nature of the soul and God in De immortalitate animae through the use of the argument from dependence.

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