Taming Augustine's monstrocity.

Aquinas's notion of use in the struggle for moral growth

Abstract : In Book VI of his Confessions, Saint Augustine offers a detailed description of one of the most famous cases of weakness of will in the history of philosophy. Augustine characterizes his experience as a monstrous situation in which he both wills and does not will moral growth, but he is a...

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Bibliographic Details
Author:Theresa Weynand Tobin
Published: S.n., s.l., 2009
Volume:34
Pages:345-363
Notes:Abstract, 345.
Periodical:Journal of Philosophical Research
ISSN:1053-8364
Format:Article
Topic:- Works > Confessiones > Conf. VI
- Doctrine > Man > [Liberté. Délectation victorieuse. Volonté] > [Libre arbitre]
- Doctrine > From man to God > [Morale] > [Études générales de morale] > [Développement moral]
Status:Needs Review
Description
Summary:Abstract : In Book VI of his Confessions, Saint Augustine offers a detailed description of one of the most famous cases of weakness of will in the history of philosophy. Augustine characterizes his experience as a monstrous situation in which he both wills and does not will moral growth, but he is at odds to explain this phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that Aquinas’s action theory offers important resources for explaining Augustine’s monstrosity. On Aquinas’s schema, human acts are composed of various operations of intellect and will, and thus are subject to disintegration. In order to capture the gap in human action between making choices to pursue particular goals and translating those choices into behavior, Aquinas distinguishes between two operations of will that he calls choice and use. I apply hisdistinction between choice and use to Augustine’s case, arguing that Augustine’s moral weakness is a result of will’s failure to use its choices. The central thesis of this paper is that Augustine’s monstrosity is a bona fide case of weakness of will that is best explained as a failure in use at the level of will.

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