Grades of freedom. Augustine and Descartes

Abstract : While Augustine distinguishes free choice from true liberty, his account of human freedom implies further distinctions which Augustine himself does not make explicit. More importantly, Augustine regards these distinct types of freedom as qualitatively different; some are clearly superior...

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autore:Christopher Gilbert
Pubblicazione: S.n., s.l., 2005
Volume:86
Pagine:201-224
Lingua:inglese
Note:Abstract, 201.
Periodico:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Numero:2
Formato:Article
Soggetto:- Dottrina > Uomo > [Liberté. Délectation victorieuse. Volonté] > Libertà
- Dottrina > Uomo > [Liberté. Délectation victorieuse. Volonté] > Volontà
- Influenza e Sopravvivenza > Età Moderna (1453-1789) > [Descartes (René, 1596-1650)]
Status:Needs Review
Descrizione
Riassunto:Abstract : While Augustine distinguishes free choice from true liberty, his account of human freedom implies further distinctions which Augustine himself does not make explicit. More importantly, Augustine regards these distinct types of freedom as qualitatively different; some are clearly superior to others. Descartes also distinguishes qualitatively different types of freedom, and does so in a way that parallels Augustine's view. I here argue that Augustine divides freedom into four qualitatively distinct grades, and then demonstrate that Descartes’ account of freedom is a rationalist adaptation of the theory of free choice found in Augustine.

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